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ABSTRACT 
 
The paper reports the results of an empirical study of a sample of Portuguese producers of equipment 
goods. The information collected for this study was based on case studies of nineteen firms. The unit 
of analysis was the firm. The information was obtained during personal interviews with the 
owner/manager of the firm or with a Director, following a semi-structured questionnaire. It was based 
on SAPPHO-type matched pair methodology. The sample consisted of two groups: the “innovative 
group” and the "average group". It is a procedure equivalent to the experimental group (innovative) 
and the control group (average) methodology adopted in the social sciences. The firms were matched 
according to a set of criteria. The objective was to see if common behavioural patterns within the 
groups and different behavioural patterns between the groups could be discerned that in turn could 
point out regularities. The inquiry looked at several functions of the firm. 
After analysis it come out that there were indeed differences between the two groups of firms 
and that the variables which showed more variability between the two groups could be grouped 
according to five broad categories, namely: tangibles (variables related to tangible assets of the firm), 
intangibles (variables related to intangible assets of the firm), management (variables related to 
management styles of the firm), external stimuli (variables related to external contingencies) and 
external sources of knowledge (variables related to external sources of knowledge). 
 Explanations for the differences in each broad category are given based on concepts such as 
demand-pull and technology-push theories, firm’s absorptive capacity, public and tacit knowledge, 
appropriability, human capital and social networks. Relying and building on short but hopefully 
elucidative descriptions of the case studies, the paper tries to explain the variation in innovation 
capacity making use of the chain-linked model of innovation. It builds on this model and, based on an 
extension of it, and inspired on evolutionary theories of technical change, it proposes a conceptual 
framework that contributes to explain the empirical findings. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This study is concerned with the behavioural causes of innovative performance at the firm level. The 
quest for the determinants of innovation at the micro level has received increased attention in the 
social and economic sciences. The interest on the issue follows from the realisation that the efficiency 
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of inputs to scientific and technological activities, as measured by the correlation between R&D 
expenditures and GDP growth rates, enjoyed significant discrepancies across a whole series of 
countries. Japanese technological performance recently reinvigorated this debate and provoked a 
frenzied search for the explanations of this phenomenon, not only at the macro level (e.g. Freeman 
1987) but also at the micro level (e.g. Womack 1990). 
 The first instances of this quest may be traced back to Marx who saw the continuous 
stream of technical innovations directly related to the selfish pursuit of rent-seeking activities by the 
capitalist pole of the dual-class society by him portrayed. The invention of new machines and tools that 
increased the level of mechanisation of the production process and which decreased the individual or 
collective power of the operators and hence allowed for the appropriation of labour surplus by capital, 
were the main goal behind the innovation process. The relentless pursuit of ever larger profits earned 
by the capitalist at the expense of the worker, the exploratory attitude of the entrepreneur and its 
disregard for his employees and fellow man, were implicitly the behavioural attributes that 
characterised a technologically successful entrepreneur. Earlier, Adam Smith also hinted at a similar 
kind of motive when he analysed the economies gained by increased specialisation, but the hints stop 
short of that and no significant attempts were made to distinguish between the features of innovative 
firms. 
 The orthodox neo-classical school of economics dismissed the subject all-together. Firms 
were viewed as homogeneous, perfectly informed, rationally acting black boxes, whose only 
admissible difference was a short lagging period necessary to adjust themselves to the price signals of 
the market. Knowledge, science and technology were assumed to be non-excludable, non-rivalrous 
public goods, exogeneously determined and at the disposal of all firms and with no extra costs 
attached. Even the notion of profit is not useful in the neo-classical context as an explanation of why 
firms innovate, given the constrains imposed by the assumptions underlying marginal analysis, and 
some authors go even further when assessing this theoretical framework: ‘...Indeed, under the 
standard assumptions [of the neo-classical theory] it is difficult to find reasons why firms exist at all...’ 
(Reinert 1995: 27). 
 However, to be fair, the neo-classical economic tradition has made significant contributions 
over the last decades to the understanding of technological progress and its interactions with market 
mechanisms. Technical change was identified as a main determinant of economic growth (Solow 
1956) and technological knowledge was incorporated in the aggregate production function as an 
endogenous production factor. Differences in factor-price ratios are pointed to as a main endogenous 
determinant of bias in the choice of technique, and the notion of induced innovation is introduced. 
Schmookler (1966) ignited the famous debate opposing the demand-pull and the technology-push 
hypothesis of technological change, by emphasising that demand factors could explain to a large 
extent the rate and direction of technological change. His study was partly a response to the argument 
advanced by earlier studies of Schumpeter that inventors-entrepreneurs were the main force behind 
technical change and growth. The notion of learning by doing and its economic implications was first 
introduced within a neo-classical context (Arrow 1962). The existence of increasing returns to scale in 
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the aggregate production function is explained in terms of externalities derived from the development 
of technical knowledge.  
 However, since these studies were conducted within the same basic assumptions of the 
orthodox neo-classical school, namely the notion of equilibrium, the rational behaviour of firms and the 
assumption of perfect information, their explanatory contribution is more at the macro-economic level 
than at the level of the firm, and its contribution was stronger to market theories than to the theory of 
the firm. The theoretical framework could not satisfactorily explain why some firms are more innovative 
than others and why there seems to exist, at any time, and given the same environment, a population 
distribution pattern that includes both firms using advanced production techniques and firms using 
older techniques. 
 Contributions to resolve this lack of theoretical support of empirical facts came initially from the 
management and organisation literature, which identified differences in the inner workings of the firms 
and then tried to identify the factors behind those differences. One group of studies (Marris 1966) 
highlights the importance of managerial motivation and discusses it in terms of sociological and 
psychological traits, such as status, power, space for personal creativity and remuneration (which is a 
more classic perspective). Another theoretical line comes from the work of Penrose (1980), suggesting 
that the firm is a bundle of physical and human resources and its evolution is fundamentally 
determined by its managerial capabilities.  
 Other approaches focus on the structural characteristics of the firm. The transaction-costs 
approach (Williamson 1981), which was inspired by Coase's (1937) account of the firm as a 
governance structure, deals with the costs associated with performing certain types of economic 
activities and their influence on the structure and size of the firm. He argues that certain inherent 
characteristics of some economic exchanges, namely those connected to imperfect markets, 
uncertainty, and opportunistic behaviour, make it more economical for the firm if those transactions are 
internalised inside the hierarchical structure rather than making them in the market. The behavioural 
perspective of Cyert and March (1963) emphasises the conflicts that arise from the fact that the firm 
pursues different goals at the same time, associated with production, inventory, market, sales and 
profit. For instance, higher sales may imply lower profits, higher production may imply higher inventory 
costs. The firm is then seen as the (unpredictable) outcome of complex internal negotiations and 
compromises that try to achieve a degree of consistency between diverse goals. 
 Explicit technological considerations are more visible in the organisational models of 
Woodward (1965), and Mintzberg (1984). They combine several salient features of earlier approaches 
into an integrated framework, and then propose a taxonomy of organisations. Woodward's approach is 
more technologically determined while Mintzberg's is the outcome of complex interactions between 
internal factors as well as external ones. In both models, the organisational structures of firms are 
closely connected with technological factors such as the degree of technical complexity or the 
characteristics of the production technology. However, they link innovative performance with 
organisational traits in a causal direction that seems to indicate that technology determines the type of 
organisational structure rather than the other way around. 
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 A different theoretical perspective on the issue of different patterns of firm behaviour and their 
technological implications comes from the evolutionary theories of economic and technical change, 
which integrates insights from the management, organisation and economic literature. Their main 
source of inspiration is the work of Schumpeter (1947), which challenged the neo-classical tradition 
assumptions of equilibrium and perfect information. The concepts of disequilibrium and imperfect 
knowledge appropriability are at the core of the Schumpeterian analysis. The neo-Schumpeterian or 
evolutionary theories assume that the choice and actions of the firms are severely constrained by 
imperfect information. Their behaviour cannot be assumed as rational but rather as "boundedly" 
rational, i.e., limited by the kind and level of information that the economic agents possess at any 
given moment. Therefore, achieving a satisficing but not necessarily optimal condition is the norm, 
rather than achieving a maximised optimal situation. 
 Evolutionary theories are stranded in a psychological basis, inasmuch as they emphasise the 
learning processes involved in the economic process, and they are less amenable to formalization. 
The behaviour of firms is dependent and shaped by the: ‘…the learning history of agents, their pre-
existing knowledge and, most likely, also their value systems and their prejudices...’ (Dosi 1994: 159). 
 Their analogies with biological systems entail the definitions of four concrete building blocks 
(Dosi 1994): 1) a fundamental unit of selection (genes), which could be technologies, policies, 
behavioural patterns or cultural traits; 2) a mechanism linking the genotype level with the entities 
(phenotypes), and these could include technological systems, firms, agencies or the mind; 3) 
mechanisms and criteria of selection, involving a long list of possibilities such as, for instance, financial 
market assessments of firms' strengths, characteristics of their products, their prices, etc.; and 4) 
mechanisms that generate variations (in the phenotypes through the genotypes), which is the 
dimension that is directly linked to the presumption of rational behaviour. 
 The link between the technological performance of a firm, which is the main concern of this 
paper, and its organisational and behavioural characteristics is achieved in the evolutionary literature 
through the notion of routines. Nelson (1982) identifies three sets of routines: 1) standard operational 
routines, related to the way firms produce under certain constrains, namely their capital stock and their 
knowledge content; 2) routines that determine the investment behaviour of the firm; and 3) routines 
that define the process of search for doing better things. 
 Working, explicitly or not, within this framework of analysis, there have been several 
contributions to the understanding of the link between innovative performance and behavioural 
patterns of firms. Miles and Snow (1978) classify firms under the heads of "defenders", "prospectors", 
and "reactors". Freeman (1982) also proposes a taxonomy based on archetypes of strategy and 
classifies them under the groupings of "aggressive", "defensive", "imitator", "traditional" and 
"opportunistic". 
 A series of empirical studies tried to identify the factors that led to success or failure in 
innovation, in a specific product, of which the most well known are probably the Project SAPPHO 
(Rothwell 1974) and the M.I.T. study (Utterback 1975). Rothwell (1977) makes a review of the results 
of seven of the more important studies and finds a considerable degree of agreement between them. 
The success factors identified are linked to good communications and effective collaboration, high 
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levels of corporate commitment, planning and management techniques (with emphasis on cost 
control), quality of management, personal policy and management style (emphasis on education and 
training), marketing and user needs, and after sales and user education. Apparently, the two sets of 
factors more strongly correlated to success are related to communications and collaboration, and 
marketing and understanding of user needs. Thus, the findings seem to revive the demand-
pull/technology-push debate, bending in favour of the demand-pull hypothesis. The author also argues 
that the innovation process is a complex one and all factors must be taken into account, but advances 
little in the way of explaining the interactions between them. Mowery and Rosenberg (1979) criticise 
the conclusion by arguing that there was a built-in bias on the studies (the criticisms addressed the 
fact that citing user needs ex post facto could be considered a tautology, that the concept "user needs" 
was loosely defined and it lacked the precision of the concept of demand, and that the technology-
push factors were not conveniently represented in the studies). They concluded that not only supply 
and demand factors are important factors but they must be coupled to ensure success. These studies 
contributed to the advancement of our understanding of the process in several ways. They represent a 
significant challenge to establish theories, they pinpointed some apparently recurrent behavioural 
factors in successful innovation, and they brought to the surface the systemic features of the process. 
They also stimulated further research at sectoral level. For instance, Pavitt (1994) builds on his earlier 
sectoral innovation taxonomy of industrial sectors (Pavitt 1984) and suggests a technology-based 
classification of key characteristics of innovative firms. 
 This paper adopts a somewhat different approach. While most of the earlier studies concerned 
with success and failure concentrated their attention on particular innovations at a particular point in 
the life of the firm, the approach here is based on the difference between the global perception of the 
firm as, all things considered, being more innovative than the average. It can be argued that the study 
of only a single innovation, at a particular point in the life of the firm, does not tell much about the firm 
as a whole and about the way it got where it is. As such, one can say that they are considerably 
influenced by a static perspective. They also do not have much to say about the way in which the 
several factors interact with each other.  
 Maidique and Zirger (1985) suggest that a more useful unit of analysis is the product family, 
rather than the single new product. They argue that organisations learn from their mistakes ("learning 
by failing" as they put it) and that a failure often may lead to a posterior success. They suggest a new 
(family) product model, which has the attractive feature of being explicitly more dynamic, based on 
cyclical failures and successes of individual products, each success feeding on a previous failure and 
each success, in turn, eventually leading to a failure (due to excess confidence bred by the success). 
 Georghiou (1986) argues that the innovation process can only be correctly understood if the 
conditions and set-up at the time of launching an innovation and its posterior progress and diffusion 
are looked at simultaneously. The author argues that a successful innovative firm is not solely 
classified by the successful market introduction of an innovation and the initial perceived innovative 
level. The subsequent actions of the firm are as vital to its success as it is the introduction of the 
innovation. Therefore the firm has to engage ‘...itself to a sequence of post-innovative improvements 
which are a necessary condition for it to retain and expand its market share’ (Georghiou 1986: 3). He 
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further argues that technological innovation is an outcome of interactions between technological 
opportunities and market needs which itself evolve over time. 
 Here, somewhat in line with the latter arguments, instead of looking at a particular product or 
family of products we look at the global performance of the firm, and we try to identify characteristics 
that are common to innovative firms and characteristics that are common to less innovative or non-
innovative firms. First, these characteristics are identified, and then an effort is made to identify the 
way in which these factors contributed to the present situation of the firm, as well as the way in which 
those factors interacted so that they eventually led to superior performances. Throughout the paper 
the reader will notice a strong flavour of the influence of evolutionary theories of technical and 
economical change. This is true, inasmuch as use is made of the conceptual framework provided by 
the analogies with the biological sciences. In particular we associate the notion of genes or genotypes 
with the identified characteristics of the firm and we associate the phenotype with the global 
performance characteristics of the firm (reduced to only two kinds, the innovative firms and the 
average firms). The main thrust of the paper will be in the analysis of the mechanisms linking the 
genotypic level with the phenotypic level and in the analysis of the mechanism generating variation in 
the genotypes. We do not consider so much the third conceptual block (mentioned above), which is 
the selection mechanism and the selection dynamics, since less emphasis is given to the 
environmental variables, and the main concern of the paper is to try to explain differential behaviour 
assuming the same external constrains. Implicitly, the degree of innovativeness is considered the best 
measure of fitness, but, as was mentioned earlier, empirical evidence suggests that this is not always 
(or indeed, even remotely) true, and some remarks on the issue will be made. 
 
THE METHODOLOGY 
 
The reason for choosing the capital goods sector is that we assume that this sector has a crucial role 
to play in terms of the innovative performance of the whole manufacturing industry, acting as a 
fundamental point of diffusion of technological capabilities throughout the society, and more 
particularly in terms of its indigenous capacity to innovate. Thus, studying what happens or happened 
within this sector may eventually bring about more understanding to the innovative performance of 
Portuguese industry, than say, looking at another sector whose perceived technological characteristics 
may rend it less useful for that purpose. Thus, while the study concentrates on just one sector it hopes 
that one can extrapolate its conclusions to other sectors as well. 
 The information collected for this study was based on case studies of nineteen firms. The 
information was obtained during personal interviews with the owner/manager of the firm or with a 
Director, following a semi-structured questionnaire. It was based on a comparative methodology 
between two groups matched by a set of criteria, inspired on (but not strictly following) the SAPPHO 
matched pair methodology. It consisted of two groups: the “innovative group” and the “non-innovative 
group” or "average group". It is equivalent to the experimental group (innovative) and the control group 
(average) methodology adopted in the social sciences. The objective, as stated, was to see if common 
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behavioural patterns within the groups and different behavioural patterns between the groups could be 
discerned that in turn could point out regularities. 
 The joint criteria for matching the two groups, on an individual basis, were the size of the firm 
and the similarity of the product lines. Ideally, matched firms would be in the same size class and 
competing with each other, but later this was found to be a more difficult task than anticipated, due to 
the small size of the industrial structure and due to the niche strategies pursued by most of the firms, 
and consequently there were difficulties in finding firms operating in the same product line. For some 
of the firms it was not possible to find a perfect match by type of product, although there were other 
firms operating in the same product line. The reason underlying this is that the allocation of each firm 
to each group is based on its relative performance to its pair, and those firms were performing at 
similar levels (according to our criteria of product improvement, quality or newness). In those cases, a 
firm operating in a product line whose technology had close affinities with the technology of the 
product manufactured by the firm in the "innovative group" was chosen. Eventually, the largest firm, 
whose main product line was in electricity power stations, was left as a stand-alone case because it 
was not possible to find another firm operating on the same product line. The only alternative was a 
subsidiary of a multi-national firm, but its activities on Portuguese soil were mainly as a commercial 
and manufacturing outpost so that conclusions based on behavioural comparison related to innovative 
performance between the two firms were bound to be fallacious, if they were only to be made based 
on the activities of the firms in Portuguese territory. It was decided not to discard this case because 
otherwise the sample would lose its representativeness vis-à-vis the whole population regarding the 
size dimension. 
 The rationale for selecting the case studies was essentially based on the characteristics of the 
products manufactured by the firms, which included the following: new features, quality and 
performance and new products (sector-wide or world-wide). The criteria were used to compare and 
select, within the national population of firms, a sample containing the “innovative group” (a group of 
firms whose innovative performance is, according to the criteria, better than the rest or above the 
average of the national population) and an “average group” (a group of firms whose innovative 
performance is, according to the criteria, equal to or below average of the national population). These 
criteria were confronted with the following sources of information and the subsequent organisation of 
that information determined the selection of the “innovative group”. The sources of information for 
selecting the “innovative group” were: reports in newspapers or industry journals, award winning 
enterprises, opinion of the professional association of the sector, opinion of individuals (industrialists) 
knowledgeable of the sector and information on expenses in R&D or human resources devoted to 
R&D as provided by national statistics. It turned out that there were quite a few firms that were 
common to two or more sources of information, so that the selection of the innovative group was 
based on the intersection of the information from all the sources, after arbitrarily choosing between 
firms that were in the same product line, and after assurance was taken that a broad range of class 
sizes was included (the smallest firm had sixteen employees and the largest twenty five hundred). 
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Table 1. The product lines and the size (number of employees) of the firms in the sample. 
 
 
'Average' group        'Innovative' group 
 
 
Pair Previous products  Present products  Size  Previous products  Present products Size 
 
1 Dumpers    Conveyors, dumpers  60  Conveyors   Conveyors  110 
  
2 Looms    Components for textile  23  Looms    Components for  40 
     machinery, textile         textile machinery and 
     machinery, other         textile machinery 
     machinery  
  
3 Wood-working machine-tools  Wood-working machine-tools  82  Wood-working machine-tools  Wood-working  290 
               machine-tools 
 
4 Textile machinery   Textile machinery   140  Looms    Hydraulic components, 70 
               lifting gear, presses, 
               textile machinery 
 
5 Agricultural machinery  Lorry bodies, agricultural machinery 30  Agricultural machinery  Agricultural machinery 200 
 
6 Metal working tailor-made  Metal working tailor-made  19  Metal working tailor -made  Metal working tailor-made 
 machine-tools   machine-tools     machine-tools   machine-tools  16 
  
7 Machine-tools for the cork industry Machine-tools for the cork industry 25  Machine-tools for the cork industry Machine-tools for the cork 19 
               industry 
 
8 Presses, components  Components, presses  25  Presses, press brakes  Press brakes,  250 
           and guillotine shears  guillotine shears 
  
9 Presses, components  Components, presses  49  Moulds, presses, press brakes, Press brakes and guillotine 103 
           guillotine shears, lathes, and other shears 
   
10           Electric power stations  Electric power stations, 2500  
               electric and electronic 
               machinery, software 
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 Each firm of the "non-innovative" group sample was then selected by randomly picking up a name out 
of a list of firms that were included in the same product line and confronting it with its pair. This list was 
provided by the professional association of the sector. The sample is presented in Table 1 indicating 
the main product lines, previously manufactured as well as presently manufactured, by order of 
decreasing importance. 
 
ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
 
The information gathered through the interviews was submitted to statistical analytical procedures. 
Due to the limitations inherent to the sample, specifically its small size and its non-randomness, the 
analysis was confined to the application of descriptive analysis, to see whether differences in the 
distribution of the responses of the two groups could be identified and were statistically meaningful. 
The raw information was coded in nominal or ordinal categories, although for some variables the initial 
information was at the arithmetic level (continuous). However due to sampling restrictions, it was 
transformed into a lower level of measurement. In the end the statistical analysis identified differences 
in the distributions. Table 2 shows the results, representing the variables that showed visible 
differences between the two groups of firms. 
 
Table 2. Identified relevant variables. 
 
Category Variable     
Tangibles Existence of automated equipment   
  Predominance of old production machinery  
  Improvements in production machinery  
Intangibles Use of CAD     
  Use of CAM 
  Quality Control laboratory 
  Existence of graduate personnel 
  Graduate intensity 
  Type of training 
  Separate R&D department  
 
Management Main source of funds for investment 
  Receiver of subsidies 
  Type of strategy 
Approach to product conception 
 
External  Existence of exports 
stimuli  Export intensity 
Importance of external competition 
Type of domestic customer 
Competition based on quality 
and performance 
  
External  Impact of technical fairs on future innovations  
sources of Search activities and suppliers  
knowledge Search activities and universities 
 
 
 The variables are categorised according to the nature of the factor involved. A set of variables 
is related to differences in the type of capital stock between the two groups of firms. They are 
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 categorised under the term "tangibles". The second set of variables is related to what is now 
commonly referred to as "intangibles" and the category in which they are included is named 
accordingly. They include the role of software, the level of education, the type of training and the 
existence of separate R&D departments and quality control laboratories. The third set of variables is 
related to management issues, and it reveals behavioural differences in areas linked to procurement of 
funds for investment, the type of strategy adopted and the approach to product conception. A fourth 
set of variables deals with what we call external stimulus to innovation and reveal differences on 
whether the firm had or not an export activity, to what type of domestic customer it was related, the 
degree of importance attached to external competition, i.e., competition in external markets or with 
incoming external products, and the degree of importance attached to competition based on quality 
and performance. Finally, the fifth set unveils some differences on the way external sources of 
knowledge impact upon the firm's innovation activities. 
Annex A gives the complete information on the responses given by each group to each 
variable in graphical form (from Figure 2 to Figure 21) and also the meaning of each variable on which 
nomenclature graphics on Annex A are based (Table 6).  
 
Demand factors 
 
The results show obvious similarities with those obtained by the successful/unsuccessful empirical 
studies briefly reviewed in a preceding section. All the factors categorised under the term "external 
stimulus" are somewhat equivalent to the "marketing and user needs" factors suggested by those 
studies. If we consider these variables as proxies for the existence of demand for certain products, or 
product features, or as proxies for a response to "needs" (whatever the definition of the term) felt by 
consumers, then the results support the arguments expressed by the demand-pull theorists. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics of the variable “export intensity”. 
  
   N Minimum Maximum Mean  Std. Deviation 
 
Average group  9 0  0.25  0.056  0.0982 
 
Innovative group 10 0.05  0.85  0.35  0.2877 
 
 
The fact that export behaviour differs significantly amongst the "innovative" and the "average" 
group (see Table 3 showing the descriptive statistics of the continuous variable “export intensity”), and 
that the importance attached to external competition is more strongly felt by the former group, can be 
interpreted as innovative firms being more responsive to user demands, in the sense that we assume 
external markets are more demanding than the average internal market. 
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 We make this assumption because roughly 90% of the exports are destined to the European 
Union countries, the United States, Canada and the Asian NICs. If, in principle, the demands from 
these markets are more commanding and require higher standards than those demanded by the 
internal average market, and assuming that products whose technological characteristics satisfying 
the internal average market would not satisfy the external markets, then demand (in its precise 
meaning involving quantities and prices) does apparently play a role in fostering innovation. The same 
argument applies for the variable "type of domestic customer", where a significant difference appears 
between those firms that are only serving regional markets (where demand for low-tech products 
exists) and those firms that are serving large domestic firms or subsidiaries of multinational-national 
firms, where demand for technically advanced products exists. 
 Using the variable "competition based on quality and performance" to claim that demand-pull 
influences are at work is more problematic because this variable can also be interpreted as a proxy for 
specific management goals or strategic objectives, not necessarily dictated by external market forces. 
It is reasonable to admit that competitive pressures would underlie a defensive-type strategic 
commitment, but one can also admit that this commitment came before any competitive factor had 
forced it into being. There is the possibility that a conscious and intrinsic consideration of the issue 
was, at some time, introduced into the firm's routine approach to product conception. If it was the case, 
then the variable would be better placed in the "management" category. To take account of the 
ambiguity the variable should be perceived as lying in a limbo between the two categories. The causal 
direction of this factor is open to doubts. It can either be considered as a consequence of market 
pressures or as a managerial cause of innovative behaviour. 
 
Education and management style 
 
Another similarity between the results of this study and other studies lies in the variable related to 
educational level. The results show significant differences between the two groups of firms concerning 
this variable. The existence of graduate personnel is apparently related to the degree of 
innovativeness of a firm. The difference is also strong when we consider the variable "graduate 
intensity" (the ratio of graduate personnel to total employment). Table 4 shows the statistics related to 
this variable. The mean intensity amongst the “average” group is less than twice the mean intensity 
amongst the “innovative” group. The minimum value for both groups is zero but there is only one such 
case in the “innovative” group while there are four such cases in the “average” group. It relates to the 
importance of having management of high quality and ability, pointed out by other studies, but it also 
reflects the importance of having personnel with high technical competence. 
 The importance of management style (openness, horizontal and organic features) is also 
pointed out in those studies but we found no significant differences between the two groups of firms 
concerning that. There are two possible reasons. First, the firms in the sample are all relatively small-
sized, with one exception, so that the horizontal and organic nature of the relationships arise naturally. 
Indeed we found that communications between owners, managers, mid-managers, technicians and 
workers were, in general, very fluid and easy to establish, not constrained by bureaucratic barriers and 
facilitated by the often small premises on which the firms operated. Very often the interviewees 
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the variable “graduate intensity”. 
   N Minimum Maximum Mean  Std. Deviation 
 
Average group  9 0  0.26  0.042  0.0848 
 
Innovative group 10 0  0.31  0.092  0.0901 
 
 
stressed the team spirit of the firm and even the presence of quasi-familiar modes of group interaction, 
and the two-way spirit of loyalty that existed between employers and employees. Simões (1995) also 
refers to “pre-Taylorist” modes of organisation in Portuguese firms and says they are not uncommon. 
Second, the considerable handicraft nature of the work involved and the type of skilled work force 
employed implied that the contributions emanating from the bottom were not taken light-heartedly, and 
that the contribution of the work force in certain aspects of the creation of the product was accorded 
significant importance. The style of management was, both in the "average" and in the "innovative" 
group, essentially organic, or, as it was described by one of the interviewees, "rigidly flexible". This 
homogeneity derives, to a great extent, from the fact that we are dealing with only one sector, 
possessing specific idiosyncratic features of operational behaviour. Had we considered more sectors, 
this homogeneity may not have emerged. However, it suggests that the type of management is not, at 
least, a sufficient condition for innovative success. 
 If we take a closer look at the response distribution of the "existence of graduate personnel" 
variable in Annex A, the same conclusion applies regarding the educational level, since there is a 
considerable proportion of "non-innovative" firms that do possess graduate level personnel. On the 
other hand, the variable "graduate intensity" (cf. Table 4) suggests that the level of investment in the 
educational level does seem to play an important role in the determination of the innovative 
performance of the firm. 
 
Planning activities and management techniques 
 
Another point of confluence between this study and other studies is the importance of careful and 
precise planning activities and the use of management techniques. The variable "type of strategy" is a 
proxy of the factor. The majority of the firms in the innovative group had some kind of formal planning 
procedure in place. Half of them planned their activities at the medium-term and long-term level, which 
involved, one the one hand a detailed one-year or two-year plan  (some firms even had a three-year 
plan) with quantitative objectives regarding costs, investments and sales, and on the other hand a 
long-term (usually five-year) plan that detailed the overall objectives and strategic orientation of the 
firm. The other half was split between those who had a medium-term formal quantitative plan and 
those that did not have a formal plan but did nevertheless have a strong strategic perception of what 
the firm should do, how to do it, and when do to it. We have labelled this mode the "visionary" type of 
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 strategy whose characteristics could not be mingled with the other type of approach to strategy 
making, common in many of the "average" group firms. This other approach is rather a non-approach, 
in the sense that there was no clear visible strategic perspective, and the firms were essentially 
engaged in the mere day-to-day running of the business apparently not worried about the possible 
threats that future changes could bring to them. More than that, they didn't seem to be engaged in any 
kind of prospective exercise to evaluate possible future trends. This type of strategy was labelled 
"short-term". The results suggest a strong association between the different types of strategy-making 
and the innovative performance of the firm. 
 
Propensity to risk 
 
The two variables named "main source of funds for investment" and "receiver of subsidies" are 
associated with risk-taking behaviour. Although the relationship with innovative performance is not 
strong, particularly in the first variable, it suggests that firms willing to take a real risk by resorting to 
outside sources of finance, e.g., by borrowing from the banks, are more likely to succeed. As it regards 
the second variable it should be noted that the subsidies under consideration are not entirely risk free. 
First, they required previous investment from the firm and did not cover the total investment. Second, 
due to bureaucratic delays in the payment of subsidies to the firms, these had to borrow more money 
than intentionally envisioned, so that, in the end, it turned out that the subsidies, in many cases, paid 
only the interest on the loan. It should also be noted that, in Portugal, borrowing from banks could be a 
really risky move because the interest rates were very high. In the early 1980s the yearly interest rate 
could be as high as 30%. Nowadays it has levelled down to a more manageable figure. 
 
Technological determinants 
 
The results of the variable "separate R&D department" show that the commitment of the firm to invest 
in this kind of resource is significantly linked to innovative performance. This link was also evident in 
other studies. As we understand it, it is a definite option taken by the firm to act in a certain way and it 
expresses the importance it attributes to technological development, as opposed to those who regard 
product development as a low-priority task and choose to base their chances on other options or do 
not perceive any advantages in doing so. 
 If this variable is considered as a proxy for technology-push determinants in innovative 
performance (in the sense that an R&D department embodies the capability to organise resources 
related to scientific and technological knowledge with a view to achieving advances that can be 
translated into the development or improvement of products) and that without such an arrangement 
innovative performance is less likely to be successful, then its significance suggests that technological 
factors seem to be as important as the factors related to demand indicated by other variables. 
 This dependence of innovative performance on technological factors should be analysed in 
conjunction with the significant relationship shown by the variable "graduate intensity" mentioned 
earlier, if we assume that the increase in graduate intensity is proportional to technical personnel 
involved in development activities. The argument is also strengthened by the strong association 
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 suggested by other variables. The superior level of production equipment exhibited by the "innovative" 
group, the importance attached to equipment upgrading, the consideration given to quality issues 
revealed by the existence of separate quality control laboratories, and the considerable use of CAD 
and (less often) CAM, all point in the direction that the capability to take advantage of scientific and 
technological advances in the firm’s own field and the capacity to exploit technological opportunities 
opened up by generic technologies are indeed crucial determinants in innovative performance. 
 
Approach to product conception 
 
The variable "approach to product conception" is a reflection of a particular kind of difference that 
showed up in the interviews and it is related to the way firms face their task of producing machines. 
The variable differentiated between two approaches. One the one hand, we have firms claiming that 
they do not sell machines but rather an operation. In their view there are several ways of performing a 
given operation and their task is to provide the best possible way of performing that task. In this sense, 
they see themselves more as service providers than as producers of machines. As a consequence, 
they spend a considerable time evaluating the environment in which the machine (operation/service) 
will be integrated and in considering the limitations, possibilities and technical synergy available and 
the interfaces required. In contrast, we have the firms that see themselves as producers of a specific 
type of machine in which they are skilled. The machine performs a single type of function and it is up 
to the customer to integrate it in the overall production process. The general attitude is: "this is what 
we do; we may make some modifications here and there to accommodate your requirement, but 
basically that is what the machine does and it can go no further than that". The former kind of attitude 
seems to be conducive to a much more creative state of mind, and the potential to search for new 
ways of doing things and to open up new perspectives when dealing with technological bottlenecks is 
much greater. Not many firms, even in the innovative group, showed this approach and the distribution 
of responses between the two groups is not particularly sharp. But it is an additional argument and 
explanation of the importance of the technological determinants of innovative performance. 
 
External sources of knowledge 
 
Some interesting relationships showed up concerning differences between the impacts of external 
sources of knowledge on innovation activities. One interesting difference is that the impact of 
universities on scanning activities was greater for the "average" group than for the "innovative" group. 
In principle, one would expect that innovative firms would be closer to universities than the less 
innovative groups, and that the innovative firms would take more interest in new knowledge and its 
potential for new applications than the other firms. This apparent incongruity can be explained with the 
notions of appropriability. First, the technological knowledge used by the sector is relatively mature, 
whether it is mechanics, electronics or even optics, and it is not strongly science-based, and 
consequently much of it is in the public domain. Second, the innovative group have largely embodied 
that knowledge within their own structure, encapsulated by the graduates and the highly skilled 
technical personnel they employ. What they search for is not knowledge with a high public content but 
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 rather knowledge with a high tacit content, one with the higher potential to improve their 
competitiveness. That is not to say that they do not have relationships and co-operation activities with 
universities, which most have. However, they seem to happen at a rather informal level. Contacts 
between ex-university colleagues or teachers are common. Co-operation is sought at very specific 
levels and in very concrete subjects. Very often it is related to solving a particular bottleneck in 
production processes, when the internal capabilities of the firm fail. Another common area of co-
operation is at the level of technical calculus that requires either a deep understanding of a 
mathematical sub-area or the need to take advantage of specific equipment with powerful computation 
facilities, e.g., to perform simulations, the kind of equipment that the firm does not have. The average 
group of firms, on the other hand, because of their often considerable limitations in educational levels, 
or graduate intensity, and consequently in their knowledge base, often find the contribution of the 
university very valuable, even if the level of knowledge provided by the university is modest. What is 
public knowledge for the innovative firms has not, in many cases, been appropriated by the less 
innovative firms. The knowledge transfer may be in the form of a specific technique to handle a certain 
type of material, a change in designs of parts to achieve certain movements, or even a simple 
mathematical calculation of power requirements, all of which can be considered to be in the public 
domain but which are not mastered by the non-innovative firms due to their low absorptive capacity.  
 The notion of absorptive capacity and the degree of "public" knowledge appropriated by the 
firms also explains the interesting relationship between suppliers and scanning activities of the firms. 
For many of the "average" group firms, an important source of knowledge comes from the suppliers. 
The suppliers act as intermediaries between their knowledge base and the forefront of technology, 
bringing to them information on advances in many areas of interest to the firm such as new materials, 
new tools, new production machinery and even new techniques. Again, much of the information 
provided by the suppliers was already appropriated by the innovative firms (the supplier works often 
for these firms) and in many cases it can be considered to be in the public domain. 
 The mechanism by which knowledge is appropriated by the two groups of firms can be partly 
explained by the informational networks which they are part of. We noticed in the interviews that the 
managers of the firms in the innovative group were apparently moving in the same social circles. They 
knew each other and were very aware of the activities each one was pursuing. They seemed quite 
intimate with the strategic perspectives and the managerial approach of their peers, and even their 
historical background and experience. The same happened with the "average" group, but to a lesser 
extent. Apparently there was a social divide cutting across the two groups of firms, with the 
consequence that the information flowing to each of them was quite different, thus explaining the 
degree of public (or tacit) knowledge appropriated by each group.  Von Hippel (1988) has described 
how these kinds of informational network build up and how knowledge is transferred between firms 
within the networks. The relationship between fairs and innovation seem to indicate that the two 
groups of firms make part of different social groups. The greater importance attached by the “average” 
firms to the knowledge obtained in trade fairs is probably an indicator of the lack of alternative ways of 
obtaining knowledge. The differences related to the variable “receiver of subsidies” may also be an 
indication of the social divide separating the two groups. The technical capacity to apply for subsidies 
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 and the social contacts and tacit and informal information required for a successful application are 
ultimately behind the observed variation. Together with the fact that the firms possess different 
knowledge bases at the start due to different educational levels, such a kind of dynamic would explain 
the disparities showed by the two groups of firms. 
 
FIRMS AND THEIR HISTORIES 
 
If the set of characteristics that distinguishes one group of firms from another is not coincidence or 
circumstantial, then one of the main issues to be addressed is how to explain the simultaneity of the 
identified constituents and how are they related to one another and to the innovative performance of 
the firm. The considerations exposed in the previous section about the differential pattern of each 
group gives only a snapshot of the present situation, but they do not give an entire explanation of why 
firms got where they are. What are the mechanisms underlying these trajectories and what cause 
firms to diverge in their path? These are the questions to which answers I will now try to contribute. 
 To that purpose maybe it will be useful to take a glance at the history of some of the firms that 
were studied. Take, for instance, the pair 5 on Table 1, both producers of agricultural machinery. This 
pair is quite useful because their product lines are very similar and their fates seem to be inextricably 
linked. Both firms started from humbling beginnings at the first half of the century, as one-man firms. 
The founders were blacksmiths forging basic manual agricultural tools such as shovels, axes, spades, 
rakes, etc. Both developed into family-owned firms by the 1930s. They started manufacturing 
somewhat more complicated products such as ploughs and trailers adopting other techniques, e.g., 
foundries, casting and soldiering, and subsequent introduction of machine-tools took place. By the 
1950s the "innovative" firm reached an industrial stage, with production being fairly based on 
machines and greater division of labour, and not so much on handicraft methods. This stage is 
reached in 1960 by the "average" firm. By this time the main products were simple and special 
purpose trailers, ploughs and a closely connected family of products, such as cultivators, drills and 
disk-harrows, all designed to be coupled to tractors (which were diffusing at a higher rate than before). 
 During that time, the sons of the founders had achieved different educational levels. Those of 
the innovative firm were educated at professional technical schools, while those of the average firm 
only went trough basic school and learned their professional skills on the job. It is interesting to 
conjecture why it happen like this. Both families had similar backgrounds and enjoyed considerable 
success in their activities. Both were located relatively near to large cities and educational facilities. If 
sociological or geographical considerations are not enough, then the explanation for it can only be 
found at the psychological level. In this context of explaining innovation differentials, the event can 
only be considered as a random outcome of a complex and inscrutable process of the mind. It will 
have considerable consequences on the trajectories of each firm due to its "expanding" or cumulative 
features. This event can be considered as a point of divergence that will drive the two firms in different 
directions, as the impact of the occurrence will effect on the future of the firms. 
 These repercussions will not be felt immediately. In the early 1970s both firms engage in 
ambitious expansion projects and they both diversify into new product lines. However, the 
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 characteristics of the products begin to show up considerable differences. The new mechanical 
techniques learned in the technical schools, the theoretical context on which they were taught, as well 
as the ancillary disciplines related to production management and accounting practices start to 
express themselves in the form of more reliable products, better applications of pneumatic devices, 
and more cost reduction savings later invested. The educational lag deepens even further. The third 
generation of the innovative firm is educated at university level, while the third generation of the 
average firm is educated at vocational technical level, the level at which the previous generation of the 
innovative firm was educated. The social networks on which the firms are now immersed are very 
apart. The implications for cumulative learning and the expansion of the knowledge base are 
increasingly important. 
 Those implications become visibly clear when the innovative firm starts to hire engineers, in 
the early 1980s, and re-structures its organisation to include a department concerned only with design 
and development. Its products are subject to increasing refinements, namely at the level of new 
materials, improved finishing, broader applications and sophistication of hydraulic components and 
controls, and new designs in mechanical parts to improve coupling with the power source, and the 
ease and reliability of operation. Planning procedures multiply reaching every type of activity of the 
firm, from the operations level to the investment level. Continuous training becomes a routine activity 
and is applied at every level. 
 By now the products are widely superior to those manufactured by the other firm and the 
range of products is broader. Sales grow and are now affecting directly the sales of the other firm, 
which were sinking for some time. 
 Other important events also took place. It adopts an aggressive marketing policy, definitely 
abandoning its regional tradition towards a national dimension. It builds an ever growing network of 
representative agents, which not only sell their products but also provide technical assistance, with 
personnel trained by the firm. It starts to export in the mid 1980s, first to Africa then, very soon, to 
France, a market that proved to be more regular and consistent than Africa. They now export around 
30% of their production of which 80% is destined to France, Spain and Germany. They also have 
engaged themselves in sub-contracting activities with French and German firms. They have agents in 
all those countries. Recently they built two factories in African countries and are now trying to build 
one in France. They have also been involved in several co-operation agreements with universities, 
both at the training level, and at the development level (in an application of optic devices to planners). 
In the early 1990s it embarks on a huge investment that covered building of new plants, acquisition of 
new automated production machinery including a robot, application of informatics at the level of 
administration, accounting, production costs control, stock management and CAD. 
 In the meantime the other firm acted quite differently. During the 1970s the firm also expanded 
and diversified into somewhat more sophisticated products, such as frontal loading cranes to adapt to 
tractors and other functionally differentiated machinery to be coupled to tractors (the other firm was 
also active in most of these product lines). However, these products demanded a design expertise that 
was gradually surpassing the skills embodied in the personnel of the firm. Knowledge of mathematical 
and geometrical principles, and techniques necessary to design articulated components and parts, 
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 were either out of reach of the present knowledge base of the firm or were becoming more and more 
costly to learn (generally involving numerous trial and error experiments not guided by a solid 
theoretical background). However, the firm did not manage to circumvent that obstacle by hiring skilled 
engineers, for instance, or by resorting to external technical advisors, even though they were aware of 
the developments going on in the innovative firm. The lack of action may have been caused by lack of 
funds, or inability to see beyond their present circumstances relying excessively on their own 
capacities, or insufficient risk taking attitudes. Whatever the case, the firm went on a downwards 
spiralling course. No new acquisitions of machinery nor improvements on the existing stock were 
made. The machinery they now possess is twenty-five years old and virtually unchanged. No attempts 
were made to expand beyond their regional level of actuation. Sales relied on market arrangements 
with sales outlets who were increasingly reluctant to buy their products. Many were now agents for the 
other firm. Sales sunk by the mid-1980s, at which time the firm decided to concentrate on 
manufacturing and repairing lorry bodies, relying on the knowledge and the machinery they acquired 
when manufacturing agricultural trailers. Note that the capacity required to build lorry bodies is lower 
than that required to build trailers, since the later often incorporated additional devices and machinery 
to serve explicit functions (pumps, motors, pressure gauges, etc.). In this sense, the firm followed an 
unlearning path because it ceased to apply on a repetitive basis the skills and knowledge it once 
applied. 
 The above comparison is an extreme one, where on the one hand we have one firm steadily 
building in a cumulative its capacities and achieving considerable success, and on the other hand we 
have a firm that is strikingly characterised by the incapacity to move ahead from where it stands, and 
actually moving backwards, because it ceased to exercise all its skills. 
 But the story could have turned in another way, had the average firm chosen at least to act in 
specific areas that could mitigate the limitations of their knowledge base. It could, for instance, have 
improved its capital stock, enabling the production of better quality products, even if that implied 
divesting in their range of products. The same applies for training activities. It seems, however, that 
their main problem was at the level of construing a coherent course of action and their incapacity to 
react to changing circumstances. 
 The histories of the firms in pair 2 illustrates how firms face several alternatives to improve 
their chances of success, even if there are intrinsic limitations in the knowledge base. Both firms 
manufactured mechanical looms, but by the mid 1960s competition from abroad seriously challenged 
their chances of survival. The educational level in both firms was at the secondary technical level. The 
innovative firm decided to abandon the production of looms because, after several attempts to 
upgrade its product, it concluded that it was not in the position or willing to take further risky 
investments in development activities. After a long search for alternatives it identified a family of 
products on which it perceived enough demand opportunities that coupled with firm specific knowledge 
and cost advantages would render its production feasible and lucrative. The product niche on which it 
grounded herself was in complementary machinery for the textile industry (lifting and transport gear). It 
also continued to manufacture components for looms. At first, the same mechanical skills used in the 
construction of looms were applied to the new product lines, then it gradually added hydraulic and 
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 other electric means of control. Over the years there was a persistent concern with the upgrading of 
the product and with the production machinery to fulfil quality requirements and cost constrains. It has 
also maintained uninterrupted efforts to keep abreast of new developments in the sector, by 
participating in international fairs, other important events, and in maintaining contacts with production 
engineers in customer firms. Most of its clients are large textile firms and it exports components to 
Swiss textile firms. 
 The firm in the average group persisted in the manufacturing of mechanical looms, although 
demand was shrinking daily. It didn't attempt to improve its educational level and knowledge base, nor 
its attempts to improve its products, based always on a mechanical paradigm, bear any results. 
Search activities were scarce and the firm didn't find a viable alternative. It began to rely more and 
more on component production and repair of old machines still in operation on local textile firms. 
Eventually it began to accept and look for any opportunity to manufacture components, even if not 
directly related to the textile sector. Occasionally it finds a local customer that still wants a machine 
(not looms) based on mechanical operation, well within its technical capabilities and knowledge base 
that has remained virtually unchanged. No resources were spent in training the work force, and no 
investments in new machinery or improvements in existing machinery were made. It now seeks 
desperately a market niche on which to survive but its efforts in scanning and search activities are 
weak and restricted. 
 The example above shows that the combination of a limited number of factors may result in 
significant improvements in the prospects of the firm. In spite of modest educational levels and 
knowledge capacities, differences in investment in production machinery, search activities and a clear 
visionary strategic perspective gave its fruits, and the point at which these decisions were made mark 
defining divergence points on the history of the firms. 
 The last example, provided by pair 1, depicts a situation where several factors are already in 
place, specifically high educational levels, upgraded production machinery and a rather well defined 
strategy, but where divergence between the two firms occurs at the level of R&D and risk attitudes. 
Both firms produce conveyors or conveyor systems for handling intermediate stages of the production 
process. The average firm relies on the technological knowledge of the owner/managers, who have 
been together since the inception of the firm, thirty years ago, and who are in charge of every aspect 
of the product cycle, from conception and design to production. There are no clear boundaries 
between departments, and none of them is exclusively concerned with development. They produce 
good but relatively non-demanding products. They only build conveyor systems to transport unitary 
solid components. The integration between mechanics, electronics and software is reached at a 
relatively simple level, were the path is essentially linear and the bifurcation's decisions involve simple 
algorithms. On the other hand, the innovative firm has an R&D department and it pours many 
resources in development work, and in hiring new engineers for R&D activities. The products are of 
better quality and reliability, and they build systems that are not only able to deal with unitary solid 
components but also with continuous non-solid components. It produces also complex, integrated 
large systems that the other firm is unable to do, due to lack of personnel and its lower capacity to 
integrate complementary technologies such as software and electronics. The innovative firm exports 
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 40% of its production to France and England while the other firm serves the domestic market. It seems 
apparent that the firms diverged due to the way they took advantage of their knowledge base and how 
cumulative effects building on their technical know-how enhanced the performance of one firm against 
the other. In this case, the relevant factors are related to risk attitude and the greater strategic 
importance attributed to R&D activities.  
 
DIVERGENCE PROCESSES 
 
The considerations given so far suggest that as firms proceed along their path they encounter specific 
moments whereby a decision has to be made that will affect the future of the firm and it has to be 
made based on the existing strengths and limitations of the firm. The outcome of that decision process 
can either reinforce and improve the perceived strengths of the firm or it can set it even further apart 
from leading firms in comparable sectors of activity. Those moments were referred to as divergence 
points and some examples were given of certain decisions and the possible consequences on the 
global performance of the firm. By way of generalising it is useful to relate these crucial points to the 
process of innovation, and for that purpose we use the Kline and Rosenberg's (1986) chain-linked 
model of the innovation process. The model includes a series of stages that define the innovation 
process at the level of the firm. At each stage we propose a series of factors that may push on the firm 
to a divergent path of low innovative performance, or conversely, towards greater innovative 
performance (Figure 1).  
 At each stage there are factors that may be more important than others. They are not 
sequential, in the sense that a previous decision leading to a low performance path does not 
necessarily mean a subsequent decision favouring another low performance path. Since there are 
several possible combinations of factors, there are also several possible divergent paths and 
consequently several performance positions possible for a give population of firms at any time. 
 This process of divergence, dependent on the behavioural attitudes of the firms, their choices 
and actions, can be represented by resorting to a biological analogy. Consider each definition of a 
particular variable in Table 2 as a gene and consider that the firm acts in a Lamarckian space, i.e., it 
can acquire features that make it better fitted to the environment on which it is immersed. Then there 
are several possible combinations of that genes and each combination will define a certain type of 
firm, or in other words and using the biological analogy, a phenotype. In the same way that a 
combination of human genes determines the global characteristics of a human being, so does the 
combination of variables define a firm innovative performance. Each gene or factor has its own 
function to fulfil and the factor related to management has the special and important task of co-
ordinating all the others. We may liken it to the DNA, the fundamental source of information and 
guidance for all the firm. The model is based on the premise that the more new genes replace the old 
ones, the more likely that its performance will be enhanced. 
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 Figure 1. Innovation stages and divergence processes. 
 
Source: 
Adapted from Line and Rosenberg (1986). 
 
The probabilities of innovative success are dependent on the managerial resources of the firm. 
Independently of these, the reasons why probabilities of better performance increase with new genes 
are based on the following assumptions: 1) the more factors are added, the higher is the probability 
that cumulative effects will lead to increased performance, and 2) the more factors are added the 
higher is the probability to increase the absorptive capacity of the firm and consequently increase the 
probabilities of adoption of new factors. Table 5 depicts several possible factor combinations and the 
deduced performance characteristics of the firm. 
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 Table 5. Combinations of factors and deduced configurations. 
 
 
   Factor combination   Deduced configuration 
 
Firm type 1  All factors present   Excellent products 
        Market leaders at domestic level 
        Very active in external markets 
        Tendency to grow 
 
Firm type 2  No factors present or low  Obsolete products 
   grade factors (only internal training, Serving only declining firms at local 
   short-term strategy)   level 
        Likely to disappear in a short time 
 
Firm type 3  automated equipment   Reasonable good products with 
   Improvements in machinery  no demanding technological  
   Visionary strategy   concepts involved 
   Information network reasonable  Likely to be component supplier in 
        precision engineered products 
        Serving essentially large firms but 
        also a host of varied firms 
        Potential to be in external markets as 
        a component supplier but eventual 
        decline (if no other factors added) 
 
Firm type 4  High education level   Good products with some level of 
   External training    demanding technology 
   Low R&D intensity   Manufacturer of sub-systems 
   Automated equipment   Serving large firms 
   Improvements in machinery  Possible sub-contracted firm  
   Good information network  supplying sub-systems to  
        leading external firms 
        Potential to growth but at a slow rate 
    
 
 For instance, firm types 1 and 2 represent the two extremes. Firm type 2 is characterised by a 
combination of low-quality factors or the absence of many of them, determining a technologically 
laggard firm, operating only on local markets and on the verge of extinction. Firm type 1 represents the 
"ideal firm" that has acquired all the high-quality factors. Its innovative performance is high and it 
operates in international markets. In between, there are a number of possible factor combinations from 
which the global innovative characteristics of the firm, the products that it manufactures and the 
markets on which it operates can eventually be deduced. 
 
SELECTION CRITERIA 
 
When working within an evolutionary framework of analysis it is fundamental to consider the 
mechanisms and criteria of selection. Above we said that we simplified the matter by assuming that 
innovative performance was the measure of fitness and that the selection criteria were based on that. 
In reality, the matter is not so simple. Firms with varying degrees of achievement co-exist, which calls 
for the identification of other selection mechanisms. On the other hand, firms with similar levels of 
innovative performance, are selected according to other criteria. Selection based on innovative 
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 performance seems to be the case in the example provided by pair 5 (although other factors were also 
important) where the firms were operating in the same environment. In other cases, the environment 
itself is not homogeneous, but multifaceted, and the selection criteria are also multifaceted. In our 
study of the capital-goods sector we found that firms face an environment that is composed of firms 
with varying degrees of innovative performance or behaviour, thus characterised by the existence of 
several demand curves. The multidimensional nature of the environment implies that the criteria of 
selection and the variables on which the firms ultimately will be selected are also multi-dimensional. 
That fact partly explains the variability of performance and behaviour in the population of firms. To 
survive, a firm does not have necessarily to adopt all factors favourable to innovative performance. It 
will selectively adopt those that will make it better suited to the particular sub-environment on which it 
lives. For instance, the average firm in pair 7 manufactures extremely simple machine-tools for the 
cork industry and it is able do so because it finds that its products are in demand from a multitude of 
small firms processing cork (making cork stoppers). The selection criterion is not based on advanced 
technology products.  One wonders if it eventually tried or if it was able to upgrade their products, and 
presumably charge higher prices, it would not then be confronted with a very different and probably 
unfavourable demand curve from that sub-environment. On the other hand, its innovative pair 
operates in another section of the environment comprised by large firms. The machine-tools produced 
by these firms are mechanically much more sophisticated and of greater reliability and quality and 
incorporate electronic and optical devices. These firms do not compete for the same clients and the 
survival or growth of one of them does not affect the survival or growth of the other, as long as the 
environment remains split, and as long as each firm does not invade the domain of the other. 
 Both the innovative firms in pairs 8 and 9 share a similar story. One started around late 1930s 
producing moulds for the glass industry. The other was founded in the mid 1950s, as a machine repair 
shop and manufacturing small machines. The former abandoned the manufacture of moulds when the 
glass industry incorporated their manufacture into their factories, and it then started to produce 
machine tools. The production was diversified (presses, shears, press brakes, lathes, etc.) but there 
was a non coincidental relation with their former activity (making moulds with presses). Competition 
during the 1960s led them to specialise in two products. The other firm adopted a specialised strategy 
earlier in its lifetime and they have been consistently in the same product line since the 1960s. Both 
firms show a quite clear vision of their goals and their strategy. Both began to export during the late 
1960s, because the internal market was not enough to provide a basis for expansion, initially to Africa 
and then to Europe. Now they export 80% of their production, of which approximately 30% to Europe, 
30% to the United States and Canada, 15% to Asia and the rest for other countries. The diversification 
of markets was adopted to prevent an excessive reliance on one country alone (a problem that was 
felt earlier, before they began to export, and later during recession periods). They both produce, on a 
serial basis, a core machine body to which they then add electronic controls, CNC controls or other 
peripherals according to the requisites of the customers. They also produce tailor made products and 
offer a series of options that can be added to the basic machine, including coupling systems to 
robotized flexible manufacturing systems. The selection criteria for these firms have been based on 
the interplay between technology, performance, quality and price. The technology of the products is 
 24 
 average/above average, not state of the art, but their quality, efficiency and reliability are excellent in 
the range at which they operate, and the price is competitive compared with other producers of similar 
equipment in the countries to which they export. This mix of qualities has proven to be quite 
successful. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper started with a brief review of the literature concerned with the determinants of innovation at 
the level of the firm, outlying the evolving theoretical views that have underpinned our comprehension 
of the subject. Contributions to the understanding of the phenomena have came from several 
disciplines, notably from the economic, organisation and management literature. More recently the 
subject received attention from scholars in the field of industrial innovation. 
 We have identified in our empirical study of the Portuguese capital goods sector a number of 
variables that were significantly associated with the innovative performance of the firm. Some of those 
factors are quite similar with those identified by other studies (such as variables linked to management 
techniques and the impact of demand conditions) and they have been used to draw conclusions about 
the influences of external demand factors, as well as the influence of internal behavioural factors on 
the innovative performance of firms. Other variables were more specific to this study, such as the 
impact of external sources of knowledge or the approach to product conception. 
 After having identified and compared those variables, we took a closer look at the particular 
trajectories of some firms and pinpointed the importance of some factors on the development of that 
process and on the way they have influenced the evolution of the firm. 
 Based on that analysis it was then suggested that differences in innovative performance could 
be explained in terms of the particular competencies that the entities acquired along their way and how 
they incorporated them within the existing structure of the firm. Failure to acquire specific 
competencies at specific points or insufficient reinforcement of existing capacities could jeopardise 
subsequent performance characteristics of the firm, due to the interactions between the several 
factors. We suggested, based on an organic, evolutionary perspective, that the presence or absence 
of specific factors would be reflected in different ways on the firm as a whole. Finally we explored 
some of the relations between the performance of the firm and the environmental selection criteria it 
faces. 
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 ANNEX 
 
 
 
Table 6. Identified relevant variables and their definition. 
 
Category Variable    Definition 
 
Tangibles Existence of automated equipment  Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
  Predominance of old production machinery Values:  
1=yes (50% or more of manual machine); 0=no 
(less than 50% of manual machines) 
  Improvements in production machinery Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
 
Intangibles Use of CAD    Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
  Use of CAM    Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
  Quality Control laboratory   Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
  Existence of graduate personnel  Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
  Graduate intensity   Continuous variable: 
       graduate personnel/total employment 
Type of training Values: 2=training plan; 1=external courses; 
0=only internal training 
  Separate R&D department   Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
 
Management Main source of funds for investment Values: 
       1=loans (more than 50% of investment) 
       0=own funds 
  Receiver of subsidies   Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
Type of strategy Values: 3=long-term and medium-term formal 
planning; 2=medium-term formal planning; 
1=visionary; 0=short-term 
Approach to product conception Values: 1=integrated approach; 0=individual 
machine 
 
External  Existence of exports   Values: 1=yes ; 0=no 
stimuli  Export intensity    Continuous variable: percentage of production 
       exported  
Importance of external competition Values: 5=crucial; 4=very significant; 
3=moderately significant; 2=slightly significant; 
1=insignificant 
Type of domestic customer  Values: 
       2=large innovative firms 
       1=any domestic firm 
       0=regional firms  
Competition based on quality Values: 5=crucial; 4=very 
and performance significant;3=moderately significant; 2=slightly 
significant; 1=insignificant 
  
External  Impact of fairs on future innovations Values: 
sources of 5=crucial; 4=very significant; 
knowledge 3=moderately significant  
       2=slightly significant; 1=insignificant 
Impact on scrutiny by suppliers Values: 5=crucial; 4=very significant; 
3=moderately significant; 2=slightly significant; 
1=insignificant 
Impact on scrutiny by universities Values: 5=crucial; 4=very significant; 
3=moderately significant; 2=slightly significant; 
1=insignificant 
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 GRAPHICS OF THE IDENTIFIED RELEVANT VARIABLES 
 
Tangibles category 
 
 
Figure 2. Existence of automated equipment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Predominance of old machines. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Improvements in production machinery. 
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 Intangibles category 
 
 
Figure 5. Use of CAD. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Use of CAM. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Internal quality control laboratory. 
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Figure 8. Existence of graduate personnel. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Type of training. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Separate R&D department. 
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 Management category 
 
 
Figure 11. Main source of funds for investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Receiver of subsidies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13. Type of strategy. 
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 Figure 14. Approach to product conception. 
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 External stimuli category 
 
 
Figure 15. Existence of exports. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 16. Importance of external competition. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17. Type of domestic customer. 
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Figure 18. Competition based on quality and performance. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
External sources of knowledge category 
 
 
Figure 19. Impact of fairs on future innovations. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Impact of suppliers on scrutiny activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 33 
 Figure 21. Impact of universities on scrutiny activities. 
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